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Ralf Bohnsack 
  
Documentary Method and Group Discussions 
 
 
 
In the first part of this contribution I will outline some central methodologi-
cal or epistemological questions which we have to deal with in qualitative 
research. It will be shown that the documentary method may give some es-
sential answers to these questions by its special stance of observation and 
analysis which then will be exemplified by research on base of group discus-
sions. 
In the second part, I will demonstrate the practice of interpretation with 
the documentary method in detail using the example of a transcript from a 
group discussion among young men with a migration background.  
1.  Methodology, Analytic Stance and Theoretical 
Framework  
Considering the actual state of art in the area of qualitative methods in Ger-
many and beyond in international discourse, one general problem has to be 
faced in methodology and practice of qualitative research: in correspondence 
with the discourse in the epistemology of social sciences, qualitative research 
is forced to overcome objectivism with its claims of a privileged access to 
reality, but at the same time has to prove its validity and its scientific quality.  
1.1 Objectivism versus Subjectivism in Qualitative Research  
The tendency towards an objectivistic stance in empirical research has its 
origin partly in criticizing the subjectivism in quantitative research. As 
pointed out, among others by Theodor W. Adorno (1976), even highly ag-
gregated data, which lay claim to representativity, mostly only permit an 
access to the subjective perspective of those under research. The differentia-
tion between the subjective meaning and the objective structure, however, 
was often gained at the expense of taking the perspective of the observer as 
more or less absolute.1 The social as well as the scientific standpoint of the 
observer thus was not reflected. 
                                                                          
1  In the area of qualitative methods in Germany, this holds especially true for example for 
objective hermeneutics  in the tradition of Frankfurt School (see also: Bohnsack 2003).    
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By criticizing this objectivism, qualitative researchers in the tradition of 
social phenomenology, turned back to the subjective meaning („subjektiv 
gemeinter Sinn“) in the Max Weber’s sense (1978) and took it as the basic 
element of methodology and theory of action in social sciences – following 
Alfred Schütz (1962) in his way of continuing and specifying Weber’s posi-
tion. This, however, has left us with an unmastered problem. By following 
the subjective meaning we can learn a lot about the perspective, i.e.: the 
theories and the intentions, of those under research. But there is no way to 
differentiate methodologically between the perspective of those under re-
search and the perspective of the observer. As a consequence there is no real 
methodological difference between common sense and scientific interpreta-
tion. 
The problematic relation between objectivism and subjectivism outlined 
here is obviously not restricted to the area of qualitative methods. It seems to 
be a rather central problem in nearly all methodologies and theories of action 
in social sciences. The discussion of these epistemological problems, howev-
er, has been carried out with a certain intensity in the area of qualitative re-
search. Both antagonistic positions – subjectivist as well as objectivistic – 
have in common that they stick to the aporie, the incompatibility, of objectiv-
ism and subjectivism. 
To overcome the dilemma between the way of empirical research which 
reconstructs the subjective meaning by systematizing it, but remains within 
the borders of what is taken for granted by common sense, on the one hand, 
and the objectivistic claim for a privileged access to reality, on the other, it 
was Karl Mannheim (1952 and 1982) who made an essential contribution as 
early as in the 1920th. Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge offers a perspec-
tive for observation and interpretation, in which – although there is a clear-
cut difference between the observer’s perspective and the subjective meaning 
attributed by the actors – the actors’ (those under research) knowledge is still 
the basis of analysis.  
Essential to this specific stance of observation is the distinction between 
two different sorts or levels of knowledge: the reflexive or theoretical know-
ledge on the one hand, and the practical or incorporated knowledge on the 
other. It is the latter kind of knowledge which gives orientation to action. 
This is implicit knowledge. Mannheim also called it „atheoretical know-
ledge“. In English it is Michael Polanyi (1985) who has coined the term 
„tacit knowledge“. 
This implicit or tacit knowledge forms a sort of structure, by which ac-
tion is orientated mostly independent from the subjective meaning, and has 
insofar a certain objectivity opposed to it. At the same time, however, this 
structure of implicit knowledge is a mental product. Mannheim (1984: 94) 
therefore has called it an „objective mental structure formation“ („objektiv-
geistiger Strukturzusammenhang“). This sort of structure, thus, – to emphas-
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ize yet again – belongs to the knowledge of the actors themselves. It is know-
ledge at the actor’s disposal, and not knowledge which the observers have a 
privileged access to, as is typical for the objectivistic approaches. The social 
scientific interpreters thus do not presume or presuppose that they know 
more than the actors in the field, but that those actors themselves do not 
really know what exactly they know. Thus, the task of the scientific observer 
is the explanation of this implicit or tacit knowledge. This epistemological 
starting position is fundamentally different form objectivistic approaches. 2 
Thus, the documentary method is apt to overcome the aporie between 
subjectivism and objectivism: Although the empirical base of research lies in 
the knowledge of those under research and in their relevance, the observer is 
not committed to their subjective intentions and common sense theories. 
Much more she or he is able to find an access to the structure of action and 
orientation, which exceeds the perspective of those under research.  
1.2  Theory of Practice and Practical Hermeneutics  
The structure which is meant here is the “structure of practice” in Bourdieu’s 
sense (1972), the modus operandi of everyday practice, the “habitus” of the 
actors (Bourdieu 1974). In a certain analogy to Bourdieu’s “theory of prac-
tice” (and partly influenced by it) it has been Thomas A. Schwandt (2002, 
2003 and 2005) in the U.S., one of the most famous younger researchers in 
the field of qualitative evaluation, who has drawn attention to the problem 
that the current understanding of research in social sciences is committed to a 
concept of knowledge (and intelligence) which is not able to meet the re-
quirements of practice of our everyday life and our practical relation to the 
world. 
Asking for the structure of practice, for the practical accomplishment and 
construction of reality means asking for he habitualized practices, based on 
the incorporated experiential knowledge of the actors which guides their 
activities. The way of social research opening up such an access to reality has 
been called “practical hermeneutics“ by Thomas Schwandt (2002: 47).  
The consequences for the practice of empirical research, however, have 
not been worked out by Schwandt himself. Nevertheless, here we can direct-
ly connect between “practical hermeneutics” in Schwandt’s sense and the 
documentary method (resp. its theoretical background: the praxeological 
                                                                          
2  According to the documentary method it is not the scientific observer’s task to apply to the 
cases under research any knowledge about rules, which is only known to him- or herself. 
Moreover, it is his or her task to explain that knowledge and the rules, which are implied in 
this knowledge, which is kept to themselves by those under research without explanation. This 
way of analysis by explanation is the way of “inducutive analysis” in the sense of 
Glaser/Strauss (1967; see also Strauss 1987) or more precisely the way of “abduction” in the 
sense of Charles S. Peirce (1932) (see also Bohnsack 2008: chapter 11).  
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sociology of knowledge), which has a tradition in the practice of empirical 
research for more than twenty years now.  
Thomas Schwandt’s position is rather different to the mainstream of qua-
litative research in the U.S., where we can identify a restriction to the dimen-
sion of theoretical knowledge. This mainstream adheres to the interpretive 
paradigm, as can be seen when reading for example the Handbook of Qualit-
ative Research edited by Norma K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (1994). 
“Interpretivism” is connected with a reduced understanding of „constructiv-
ism“.3 In this understanding constructivism is restricted to the interpretive 
und definitoric construction or production of reality (see more detailed: 
Bohnsack 2009a). Thus, the subject of research is essentially restricted to 
„theoretical world-cognition“, as we can call it using a term from Martin 
Heidegger (1986: 67). In contrast to that understanding of constructivism, a 
broader understanding of it also comprises the production and construction 
of the world in everyday practice (see also Bohnsack 2001 and 2005). 
The restriction to the „theoretical world-cognition“, to the theoretical 
knowledge of the actors in social research, is mainly supported by the fact 
that the methodical access to this dimension of action is uncomplicated, em-
pirical research is protected from complications and bigger efforts, because 
in this dimension, social science research can confine itself to the reconstruc-
tion of the common sense theories of the actors. And that means it can stick 
to that level of knowledge which already has been explicated by the actors 
themselves. Their expressions can be taken literally.  
1.3 The Change in Analytic Stance from Asking ‘What’ to Asking 
‘How’: from Immanent to Documentary Meaning  
Going beyond the literal meaning or – in terms of Karl Mannheim (1952) – 
the “immanent” meaning, requires a change in analytic stance. The documen-
tary interpretation presupposes a change in analytic stance which is different 
from common sense. It is the change from the question what social reality is 
in the perspective of the actors, to the question how this reality is produced or 
accomplished in these actors’ everyday practice. By practice, I mean the 
practice of action as well as of talk, of presentation and of argumentation. 
The change from asking what to asking how, is also constitutive for the 
constructivist stance of analysis. In the sense of the system theory of Niklas 
Luhmann (1990: 95), this is the transition between observations of first to 
observations of second order, the transition from observation to “observing 
the observations”.  
                                                                          
3  The terms „interpretivism“ and „constructivism“are mostly used synonymously in qualitative 
research in the U.S. – see among others Guba/Lincoln (1989) und Greene (1994). 
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Thus Karl Mannheim has outlined the first explanation of the stance of the 
observer in the social sciences, which still meets the requirements of episte-
mology today. The constructivist stance of analysis – especially where it has 
become relevant for empirical research – has been influenced by ethnome-
thodology. Here – for the first time – social reality is considered in a radical 
way from the point of view of its „ongoing accomplishment“, as Garfinkel 
(167: vii) puts it. The documentary method is one of the crucial terms of 
ethnomethodology, taken over from Mannheim (1952) by Harold Garfinkel 
(1961 and 1967).4  
The documentary method offers – on the level of an observation of the 
second order – an access to the pre-reflexive or tacit knowledge, which is 
implied in the practice of action. Asking for the documentary meaning can – 
as I already mentioned – be understood as asking for how: how is practice 
produced or accomplished. That means, asking for the modus operandi of 
practical action. This question has to be distinguished from asking what (on 
the level of the observer of first order), for the immanent or literal meaning. 
Concerning group discussions, the immanent meaning comprises that 
stock of knowledge which can be made explicit by the participants them-
selves. This has to be distinguished from knowledge of experience, which is 
so much taken for granted by the participants that it must not and often can-
not be made explicit by themselves. The participants understand each other 
because they hold common knowledge without any need to explicate it for 
each other.  
If we look at group discussions or at everyday talk in general, only on 
the level of the literal or explicit meaning, discussions often seem to be with-
out real connection between topics and without any general structure. It 
seems to the observer as if new meanings emerge constantly. I would like to 
illustrate this problem with an example from a research project about young 
migrant people of Turkish origin (cf. Bohnsack et al. 2002 and Bohn-
sack/Nohl 1998). The discourse was initiated by the interviewers asking if 
the young people actually live with their parents. First, the male youths in 
turn give narrations. They express that it would be impossible to smoke in 
the presence of the father because of their respect for him. Then they deli-
neate how they behave in their peer group. At last, one of them depicts the 
situation of a visit in a restaurant with his German girlfriend. There was a 
dispute with her about who is allowed to pay the bill. 
 Although the topics change permanently, the young people understand 
(in German: “verstehen”) each other obviously without being able to interp-
ret (in German: “interpretieren”) each other’s utterances (cf. also below: 1.6), 
                                                                          
4  The understanding of the documentary method in ethnomethodology of Harold Garfinkel is (in 
comparison to the understanding of Karl Mannheim: 1952) however connected with some 
limitations in theoretical perspective, which cannot be considered here; see: Bohnsack 2001 
and 2006). 
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that means: without being able to explicate the message connected with their 
depictions – to explicate the framework or structure of orientations, which 
underlies their depictions. This framework of orientations, as we call it, can 
only be unfolded by depictions and narrations, that means: it can only be 
depicted metaphorically. It is the researcher who on behalf of the participants 
explicates their frame of orientation, who brings it to terms. The task of the 
researchers as documentary interpreters, thus, is the theoretical explication of 
the mutual implicit or intuitive understanding of the participants. 
Only when researchers succeed in such explications, will they be able to 
identify the pattern of meaning resp. the problem which underlies the whole 
discourse and which is worked out through different topics. Thus, it becomes 
possible to look beneath the surface of continuously emerging new opinions 
of the participants and to identify those general patterns or frames of orienta-
tions which are represented in the discourse. 
In our example that pattern of meaning or orientation which could be 
identified throughout the whole discourse, has been called the pattern of the 
“separation of spheres”. It is a separation between the inner sphere, the 
sphere of life inside the family, the networks of relatives and ethnic commu-
nity, and the sphere outside of it in the public: the outer sphere. This distinc-
tion is constitutive for the youths entire everyday practice. So we can see that 
the traditional habitus of respect towards father and family requires to keep 
central elements of the outer sphere (that means: the activities of the young 
people within the peer group, at school and at the work place) out of the 
inner sphere (for example, even the activity of smoking a cigarette).  
Thus, we have a separation or severance of spheres which makes it hard-
ly possible to have an open negotiation between children and parents about 
problems relevant for the young people’s identity. Both spheres with their 
different morales stand apart from each other. This separation of spheres 
concerns different areas of the everyday life, which become topics of dis-
course – among others i.e., the relationship with the German girlfriend. In 
case of a conflict between these different morales there is no (meta-
)communicative negotiation with the girlfriend, but a strategic circumven-
tion.  
Also in other passages of the same group discussion (for example when 
the young people talk about their experience with ethnic discrimination), we 
find that frame or pattern of orientation we have called the separation of 
spheres. On a certain level of abstraction, we can recover a homologous 
pattern throughout the entire discourse once we have succeeded to identify it 
in one of the passages or topics.  
Those passages are much better qualified than others to identify the gen-
eral pattern of orientation in the sense of the habitus of a group or a person 
we call focusing passages or focusing metaphors. These passages are charac-
terized by detailed or dense depictions (what we call metaphorical density) 
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and by a high commitment (what we call interactive density). The identifica-
tion of these passages makes it possible to get a quick and valid access to the 
central patterns of orientation.  
By this example central components of the documentary method, especially 
the documentary interpretation of group discussions, can be demonstrated:5 
 
?  The documentary meaning can be distinguished from the immanent or 
literal meaning. 
? The documentary meaning reveals itself, if the process of discourse is 
taken into account.  
?  On the one hand, such a process analysis requires a detailed reconstruc-
tion of the reference of the utterances to each other. We call this „organi-
zation of discourse“.  
?  On the other hand, such a process analysis means to take into account the 
„dramaturgy of the discourse“, to identify its culminating points, its „fo-
cusing metaphors“  
1.4 Focusing Metaphors and Conjunctive Spaces of Experience  
Culminating points in the dramaturgy of the discourse, as they are 
represented by focusing metaphors, refer to the centers of common expe-
rience of the members of the group, to the centers of a common space of 
experience. Following Karl Mannheim (1982), we call this a “conjunctive 
space of experience” (in German: “konjunktiver Erfahrungsraum”).6 Those, 
who have biographic experience in common, have commonalities in their 
history of socialization and, thus, have a common or conjunctive experiential 
space, understand each other immediately insofar as these biographical 
commonalities become relevant in interaction and discourse. 
These commonalities can be found in different dimensions. They may 
concern the dimension of generation, of gender, of milieu or class, the di-
mension of the life course or – as in our example – the dimension of migra-
tion, because the young people have a common history of migration. Accor-
dingly, we distinguish between those spaces of experience which are genera-
tion, education, gender, and migration specific and/or specific for a phase in 
the life course (for instance adolescence). To take this into account, empirical 
analysis must always be multidimensional.  
                                                                          
5  For further examples of research with group discussions and the documentary method see 
the contributions in: Bohnsack/Przyborski/Schäffer 2006, and for further information on the 
methodological background and the history of the method of group discussion see: Bohn-
sack 2004 as well as 2008: chapter 7.    
6  Differing from the English translation in Mannheim 1982 (p. 204), where we can find the 
term: “conjunctive experiential space”, I prefer to translate the German “konjunktiver Er-
fahrungsraum” (Mannheim 1980: 227) with “conjunctive space of experience”. 
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Which one of these experiential spaces becomes dominant, depends on the 
composition of the participants in the discussion (see also Przyborski 2004), 
on biographical elements shared by the participants. The reconstruction of 
the dramaturgy of the discourse and, thus, the identification of focusing me-
taphors enables us to identify the space of experience and, thus, the back-
ground of socialization which is dominant within the group (in our example 
this is the space of experience of migration in the history of the family).  
The group then gradually adjusts itself to those topics, which are in the 
centre of the common experience, if the researchers are successful in initiat-
ing a discourse, which may gain a self-dynamic and, thus, becomes indepen-
dent from researcher’s interventions. This means that researchers – at least in 
the first phase of a group discussion – should interfere with the discussion 
only insofar as this contributes to getting the discourse going, to enable, to 
initiate or to keep the self-dynamics of the discourse (see also Bohnsack 
2008: chapter 12.1).  
The self-dynamics are important for another reason: it is only in the in-
terplay of the mutual reactions of the participants that the collective meaning 
(in difference from the individual meaning) of the utterances is constituted 
and by this is available to the researcher’s interpretations. It is solely in the 
mutual references to each other that the collective pattern of meaning, the 
tacit knowledge as a collective knowledge, documents itself. 
Besides initiating the self-dynamics of the discussion, it is a central prin-
ciple of leading a group discussion to initiate or generate descriptions or 
narrations of everyday practice. The implicit knowledge of those under re-
search can be found mostly in concrete and detailed depictions of practical 
action. By this the structure or patterns of orientations underlying the prac-
tical action, the „modus operandi“ or the „habitus“ in the terms of Pierre 
Bourdieu, can be identified.7  
Let me give you another example; it originates in earlier research on young 
people from a small town in Northern Bavaria (Bohnsack 1989). Here, we have 
a passage taken from a discourse of young female workers. In the young 
women’s discourse – in contrast to young men – gender relations became the 
central topic, a topic that demonstrated all the features of a focusing meta-
phor and, thus, were in the focus of the discourse. The following passage 
which I will explain to you, is about the gendered division of labor – more 
specifically, it is about their respective father’s participation in housework.  
In the following, we will look at part of a longer depiction given by one 
of he girls, a depiction of how the father potters about in the kitchen (Haus: 
Geschlechtsrolle, 5.07-42 u. 6.20-27). (In the original version the transcript is 
in the Bavarian, or more precisely, in the Franconian dialect, which, of 
course, cannot be transmitted here): 
                                                                          
7 For further information concerning the terms „habitus“ and „patterns of orientation“ see: 
Bohnsack 1998 and 2008: chapter 8) 
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Text: Discussion group: House. Excerpt: gender role  
Df: When my mother is cooking, he says: what have you been cooking again, what does it 
taste like, let me have a look. Then she says: go away, I am doing the cooking, o.k.. Or 
when he has his fit sometimes, he goes away and buys meat and stuff, and then she 
says: what have you bought again? Hmm, I’ll cook something in advance and we’ll put 
it in the freezer it then. Then he goes there (in the kitchen) and cooks from nine in the 
morning till ten in the evening if it’s possible. And then we always have to, we are not 
allowed to stand around in his way, but we are also supposed  
                                   ?                                   
several:                          @1@ 
Df: to tidy up. He takes everything out, he needs all the cooking pots, for everything he 
cooks he needs a separate pot (.) he always says we have four hotplates he always 
says: there are not enough   ? 
                                   ? 
several:                  @1@ 
 
Df:  hotplates for me, we need more hotplates, he cooks like a maniac, I’m serious, and he 
always   ? 
                                                                   ?                                           
several:             @ 3 @ 
 
       says. Now I haven’t got a pot left, (.) clean the pots, then we are standing there clean-
ing the pots. Then he says , now you are standing in my way again and then (.) then  
 
                                                                    ……..    
        
Df:  But when the, when the (my) mother is sweeps the kitchen or so (.) then he runs 
through the kitchen so that you can see every (single) step. My mother says: Couldn’t 
you have waited until (.) until this is dry, it only takes five min-utes? No I’ve had to go 
in there right now. And (.) (        ) (.) (         ) (.) he is allowed to do everything. But we 
are always playing the twits, when he is doing the cooking, that really annoys me.  
 
The young women deal with a problem which is obviously central for them 
by in turn contributing descriptions and narrations of their everyday family 
life. For us, who were leading the discussion, it was – at least at the begin-
ning – not at all clear, what was going on here (in terms of ethnomethodolo-
gy: the utterances were highly “indexical”; see: Garfinkel 1961). 
1.5  Habitus or Framework of Orientation as Central Subjects of the 
Documentary Method 
After a procedure of interpretation (which is exemplified in its steps below in 
chapter 2: „Exemplary Interpretation of a Text“) we can at least work out the 
following pattern of meaning, that is: the documentary pattern of meaning as 
the the young women’s framework of orientation:  
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? Pretending to be helpful to the women with his cooking or maybe also 
believing he is being helpful, the father is allowed to penetrate into the 
women’s sphere, into the kitchen and to have his ‘go’ there. In this way, 
the father does not take any responsibility neither in respect of economy 
nor tidiness. The responsibility remains with the women.  
 ? Modes of men’s participation which are not really organized according to 
partnership in the sense that men take over any responsibility, are only 
apt to restrict the women’s scope of action. At the same time, they in-
crease the burden of their work, because men – having dealt more play-
fully with female work – can retire and leave the main work, the „dirt“ 
and „muck“ to the women, as the girl puts it, so that women at last are the 
‘twits’ or ‘dupes’ or losers.  
? Although it does not correspond with the desires or intentions of the girls, 
who would prefer living together in a mode of partnership, the more conven-
tional organization of the roles has the advantage that it opens up a sphere of 
autonomy to the women within these limitations. It becomes evident that this 
is the central framework of orientation or habitus of the young women. 
  
The other girls participating in the discussion then referred to each other by 
bringing other depictions of social scenes into the discussions, which in parts 
had different topics: for example, the relation to the boyfriend and his sexual 
obtrusiveness or the relation to the father, who uses physical violence trying 
to discipline his daughter. 
Looking carefully at the depictions in this passage as well as in other 
passages and also in discussion with other young female workers, the same 
pattern, a homologous pattern of meaning is always documented. Searching 
for this homologous pattern of meaning is the general task of the documenta-
ry method: obviously, we have homologous problems in different groups. 
This is the problem of defending the women’s sphere against men, and their 
practice of intervention. 
At the same time, these metaphorical depictions of the young women 
may give us an explanation for this gender specific orientation. Our interpre-
tations in the framework of the sociology of knowledge are about to recon-
struct or redesign those social processes or processes of interaction, of which 
this gender orientation of the division of spheres, may be seen as a result. 
These gender relations may be seen as the result of a background or space of 
experience, which can be reconstructed or redesigned. We call this recon-
struction the sociogenetic interpretation. 
By these interpretations of the scenic or metaphorical depictions we also 
get an access to those activities and consequences of action which are not 
identical with the theories, intentions or normative expectations of the actors. 
We can get some insight into the non-intentional consequences of the activi-
ties apart from normative demands and apart from the common sense-
theories.  
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Thus, the intention or the normative demand of the father in our example is 
“to be helpful in the kitchen”. The consequences or entanglements of action, 
however, look quite different. On the other side, the normative or theoretical 
orientations of the young women concerning partnership sharply contrast 
what is documented in their depictions. In the process of family interaction 
they are always entangled again into a structure which let them refrain from 
the orientation to partnership in favor of the outlined habitus of the division 
of spheres. The documentary method as a process analysis, thus, also allows 
us to differentiate between theories, norms and intentions on one and the 
non-intentional or habitualized activities or practices on the other hand.  
1.6 Understanding (Verstehen) versus Interpretation (Interpretieren) 
Taking a closer look at the young women’s depictions, we can see that the 
documentary or metaphorical meaning cannot be brought to an explication 
by the young women themselves – neither the pattern of orientation concern-
ing the division of spheres nor the process of the genesis of this pattern of 
orientation. The depictions of their experience much rather belong to the 
preflexive or implicit knowledge. The theoretical explication is, as mentioned 
above, the task of the scientific observer. Such an explication of the implicit 
patterns of meaning is what we call interpretation. 
Those patterns of meaning, however, can also be comprehended, as al-
ready mentioned, without an explication, that means: without an interpreta-
tion. This is what Karl Mannheim (1982: 242pp.) called „understanding“ (in 
German: „Verstehen“; Mannheim 1980: 271pp.). The young women under-
stand each other by referring in turn to the tacit knowledge or tacit meanings 
which are implied in their depictions without any necessity to interpret each 
other. In contrast to understanding it is interpretation that means the (theoret-
ical) explication of the process of practical action by which the pattern of 
orientation is constituted and reproduced, which requires a specific line or 
stance of analysis, namely a „genetic stance“, which I characterized by ask-
ing how.  
This analytic stance is connected with „bracketing the validity aspect“ 
(Mannheim 1982: 80) of social facts (in German: “Einklammerung des Gel-
tungscharakters“; Mannheim 1980: 88), i.e., it is connected with a suspension 
of the character of validity of social facts. The claims for truth and normative 
rightfulness, as they are connected with the social facts by those under re-
search, are put in brackets, are suspended. Thus, the interpreter has no inter-
est in the question, if the depiction (i.e., the description how the father potters 
about in the kitchen) is right, if it corresponds to the fact or to the truth. 
Moreover, the interpreter asks for what is documented in the young women’s 
experiential depictions about their attitude, their habitus, their frame of orien-
tation.  
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Because that pattern of orientation or meaning, which is constitutive for their 
everyday practice (the pattern of the division of spheres), is not explicated by 
the young women themselves, it is not completely conscious to them. How-
ever, as it comes to an expression in their descriptions and narrations, it is 
also not totally unconscious or latent. Concerning the question which sort of 
consciousness we have about our own habitus, Bourdieu has commented that 
we cannot oppose a „completely transparent consciousness“ to a „totally 
opaque consciousness“. According to Bourdieu (1972: 200) it is self-evident 
„que l’on ne peut répondre en opposant, selon l’alternative du tout ou rien, la 
conscience parfaitement transparente à l’inconscient totalement opaque“.  
Those patterns of meaning and orientation which are subject to interpre-
tation in the documentary method, belong to the young women’s collective 
stock of knowledge in such a way that they actually do not know what they 
know. And the explication of this implicit or tacit knowledge is (as men-
tioned repeatedly) the task of the documentary method. To the main differ-
ence between the immanent or literal meaning on the one hand and the impli-
cit or documentary meaning on the other, I will now come back to a rough 
sketch of the working steps of the documentary method (which are exempli-
fied in chapter 2: „Exemplary Interpretation of a Text“). 
1.7 Formulating and Reflecting Interpretation  
The transition from the immanent to the documentary meaning is, as ex-
plained above, the transition from asking what to asking how. In accordance 
to this, what has been said, depicted, or discussed, what has become the topic 
of discourse is to be separated from how – that means: in which framework – 
the topic is dealt with. This framework of orientation (which we also call 
habitus) is the central subject of documentary interpretation. The compara-
tive analysis from the outset is of central importance for this interpretation 
because the framework of orientation takes shape and can be empirically 
examined only in comparison to those of other groups or other cases. We 
have to ask: how is the same topic dealt with by other groups or by other 
individuals?8  
Concerning the practice of research, this methodological difference be-
tween the immanent and the documentary meaning, resp. the difference be-
tween the observations of the first and the second order, results in a clear-cut 
separation of two working steps: following this two step interpretation, it can 
                                                                          
8  Comparative analysis is not only for the generation of types but also from the outset of the 
reflecting interpretation of central importance for the documentary method. And here we also 
owe much to grounded theory in its original version (Glaser/Strauss 1967; Glaser 1965). The 
concept of generating theory in the grounded theory, however, does not achieve the level of 
multidimensionality in generating types (see 1.8).   
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be made clear where and how far that, which has been interpreted (i.e., expli-
cated by those under research), is only formulated by the researchers – this is 
what we call formulating interpretation – and when, at which point, the re-
searchers bring up their own interpretations in reflection upon the implicit 
self-evident knowledge of those under research; this is what we call reflect-
ing interpretation.  
The basic structure of formulating interpretation is the decoding and 
formulation of the topical structure of a text. Formulating interpretation in 
itself is separated into different steps (which are explained in chapter 2). The 
task of the reflecting interpretation is, as mentioned above, the reconstruction 
of the framework of orientation, of the habitus. To be successful, we have to 
get access to the inner logic of the utterances and their references, of the text 
produced, and thus, have to reconstruct the formal structure of the text (apart 
from its topical structure which is the subject of formulating interpretation), 
as we also do with the formal structure of the picture (see the other contribu-
tion of Ralf Bohnsack in this volume). 
In the case of group discussions it is above all the (formal) organization 
of discourse which has to be reconstructed. This means we have to character-
ize the way of how participants refer to each other formally in their utter-
ances (see also chapter 2 and Bohnsack/Przyborski 2006, as well as Przy-
borski 2004). 
1.8  Typification and the Multidimensionality of Analysis  
The next step of analysis, the step of typification, of constructing types (cf., 
i.e. Bohnsack 2007 and 2009a), builds on the components of the framework 
of orientation common to all the cases (groups): For example, in our research 
about young people of Turkish origin, we were able to identify more or less 
in all cases, in all groups, one common problem of orientation, which I cha-
racterized above as the problem of the separation of spheres, the separation 
of the outer from the inner sphere. When we classify this as typical for migration 
and, thus, build – as we call it – a migrational type, we practice comparative 
analysis insofar as we are looking for things in common to all groups of 
people of Turkish origin. Furthermore, we also use comparative analysis 
insofar as we look for differences, for contrasts to non-migrant groups.  
Going further, the reconstruction of a migrational typification is only va-
lid if the migrational (conjunctive) space of experience can be worked out in 
its relation to other spaces of experience, resp. to other typifications. We also 
refer to an overlap of different spaces of experience or different typifications. 
For instance, when comparing young people of Turkish origin of different 
sexes, from different milieus or classes, and from different generations, we 
find different ways of dealing with the same migrational problem; the prob-
lem of the separation of spheres. 
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 On the one hand, comparative analysis is required to reconstruct, i.e, gender 
and generational typifications as variations or differentiations of the migra-
tional typification. On the other hand, the validity and the generalizability of 
the migrational typification is only proved, if it can be identified throughout 
these overlaps or differentiations. The degree of validity and generalizability 
of a single typification – for instance the migrational typification – depends 
on how manifold, i.e., how multidimensional the single case may be located 
within an entire typology, how often it can be related to other typifications 
like gender, generation or life cycle (cf. in more detail: Bohnsack 2007 and 
2009a). This is what is meant when we say that – in the perspective of the 
documentary method – typifications are always multidimensional.  
2. Exemplary Interpretation of a Text  
2.1 Transcript  
The guidelines for transcription according to the documentary method are 
given in annex I of this publication.  
The German original of the transcription contains words spoken in Tur-
kish accent or Berlin dialect as well as mistakes in word order or choice of 
words. In the English translation, we tried to give an account of the speaker’s 
original expressions which explains unusual phrases and sentence structure 
in the English transcript.  
 
Text: Discussion group: “Sand” Side B 3/6 
Excerpt: “Marriage” (duration: ca. 5 minutes)  
 1 Ym: Do you want to have a family some day? (1) 
 2 Bm:          ?yes, when (1) when our time has  
 3    come for that, don’t know (.) I can’t tell; (2) 
 4 Am:          ? yes having a family is nice  
 5   but it is not easy you know, (2) 
 6 Y1:     ?mhm 
 7 Bm:         ?I am unemployed anyway and so on  
 8   (2) I think I won’t get married so soon. 
 9 Am:    ? a family what does it mean a family °you know?° (1) ° (no) (3)  
10 Bm: I would have had some opportunities to marry, but I did not do it in  
11   the end. 
12 Am:            ?you have to find the right one you know, that’s what I think. (.) Of  
13                      course (.) I want to marry                      ? 
14     Y1:                       ?mhm 
15 Am: or uhm I want to live together with a woman; (3) but at the  
16    moment, (4) °ehh° (.) it’s not @so easy you understand?@ 
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17: Y1:       ? @yes@ 
18 Bm:              ? If 
19     I (            was given the opportunity          ) some day 
20 Am:   ? well you cannot find the right one you know, for example (.) I have uhm  
21    have at the moment, I say (.) many women you know? ((clearing throat)) but (.)  
22             I don’t like any of them; I can’t take one of them you know? (.) I cannot say  
23   okay you are my wife °can I° (3)          ? 
24 Y1:                              ?mhm 
25 Am: because for me a woman (.) has to be perfect you know, (2) I mean she has to   
26              be (.) there for me all the time you understand, and I for  
27 Y1:              ?mhm 
28 Am: her too; (1) that’s the way I think but eh many people do not think so. (2) °yes.°  
29   (7)  
30 Am: and when I get married I get married in my way °you know,° (3) 
31 Bm:                        ?In  
32    your way? 
33 Am: ? yes. I mean it  cannot tell me anything 
34 Bm:          ? how do you mean? 
35 Am: I mean (.) my mother for example says to me (1) yes I live how I:  
36   think it to be right; you  understand, 
37 Bm:           ? yes; (2) yes I don’t know either (.) but I  
38              believe sometimes you just have to adjust to your family you know, 
39 Am:                                       ? I mean know she  
40              wants to (.) tell me                    ?                
41 Bm:                                                                                   ? to  
42   adjust to the culture and so on. 
43 Am:                ? yes what culture yes, °I° 
44 Bm:                                 ? yes but actually you  cannot  
45   forget your culture; you have your own culture too; you cannot suddenly 
46   say yes no (.) if you if (.) if you don’t know who you are you cannot 
47   (2) you are  
48 Am:      ? °yes::° 
49 Bm: nothing (.) °somehow like that.° you must know what you are and  
50 Y1:          ? mhm 
51 Bm: who you are 
52 Am:   ?now at ours  two are engaged; yes now says to me, (.) my  
53   mother says to me now, (.) better take one from (.) uhm (2) from our  
54   region you know, I mean from  
55 Y1:            ?mhm. 
56 Am: our family’s surrounding. (1) she says to me; °(I mean)°. (1) and there where I  
57   was last year, (2) an acquaintance has a daughter you know, (1) and he says to 
58             me,(.)do you want to have a look at her, won’t you (.) how do you like her, I        
59   sai-no I don’t want anything @you know what am I supposed to do with her yes (.)  
60 Am:             ?@(.)@           
61 Bm:    ?@Yes@ they do match- 
62     making; it’s matchmaking 
63 Y1:        ?Yes             ? 
64 Am:              ? matchmaking you know, then I was in Istan- 
65   bul, my (.) uncle said to me, I go to Kocaeli; this is the next (.) town  
66   yes; (1) it is (.) pretty close two hours. (.) you can come with me yes when  
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67   he says, he said, if you like (.) yes ehh (3) Baldiz ((Turkish word)) what does it  
68   mean? Baldiz, (1)   
69 Bm:             ?Brother-in-law? 
70 Am:        ?I mean (a  is) the sister of his wife (.) is supposed to  
71              live there you know, (2) he said if you                           ?             ? 
72 Bm:            ?        ? yes I see. 
73 Y1:                                                                                           ?(sister-in-law  
74   you say) 
75 Am: like my sister-in-law will be there too, you may become acquainted with her 
76              you know, (2) I said I will only come to ehh see the town you know, 
77 Y2:  @(.)@ 
78 Bm:          ?@yes. (2)  
79 Am:             ?@(2) no I do really mean that (2)@ 
80 Bm:                    ?of course that’s the reason why you  
81              went there you now,@ 
82 Am:  no because for me this was @(2)@ 
83 Bm:     ?@yes tell us that you went there! (.) it 
84    somehow    ?  ? 
85 Am:      ?@(2)@   ?sen  
86    (erdo) anlat- ((Turkish)) 
87 Bm:  doesn’t matter;@ 
88 Am:  sana ((Turkish))  ?For me it was, Kocaeli (.) I wanted to see it anyway,  
89    you know, and I said to me it doesn’t matter 
90 Y1:      ?mhm 
91 Am: I go there and eat uhm eh something together with them and then we come  
92   back again it is quite nearby anyway, (2) then I was there, (.) it’s a small  
93   town, (.) we ate something together, (1) and then he  
94   asked me, and °eh° how do you like her? I said what kind of question @is that,  
95   you know, (4)@ 
96 Y2:   ?@(.)@ 
97 Bm:          ?@yes what’s happening here; you get paranoia at first@ 
98 Am:                ?I sai- that’s all right 
99   you know I don’t want to hear anything about it; now if I say I don’t like her  
100   or then (.) he will be 
101 Y1              ?mhm 
102 Am: offended (.) at once yes (2) then he always turns to me 
103 Y1:               ?mhm 
104 Am: I said no I don’t want you know; I don’t like her I said  
105   she doesn’t look good @(3)@ then he said (2) 
106 ?:         ?@(.)@ 
107 Am: then we are again he they want to find someone for me you know  
108   I mean (.) if he did not succeed then comes the  
109 Y1:     ?mhm 
110 Am: next you know; ey Am, @I have a (1)@ (1) I say  
111 Y2:            ?@(3)@ 
112 Am: stop it I don’t want to. and when I was back in the village, (3) appar- 
113 Y1:        ?mhm 
114 Am: ently my mother had called said ((clearing throat)) Am comes, (.) and (.)  
115   he is looking for a girl or he wants to have a girl you know, (.)  had said so 
116   (once); and at once when I come out of the house in the village, in our village  
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117  there is a waterfall you know where the people (.) 
118 Bm:                           ? scoop water. 
119 Am:            ?scoop water you know, (.)  
120   I came out (1) it was really in the morning, and all women were standing there   
121           at the water you know, (2) @(7)@ 
122 Y1:          ? mhm 
123 Bm:       ?@suddenly you were standing there they are watching   
124   or what (.) according to old tradition they are watching (2) 
125 Y2:       ?@(.)@ 
126 Bm: that’s what it was like? @(1)@ how nice you know you should have made a film 
127 Am:           ?@(        ) were standing a lot yes@ 
128 Bm: ey. @(2)@ 
129 Am:      ?@there were many yes@ 
130: Bm:                         ?@Turkish films are like this ah (.)@ 
131 Am:          ?really.@ (2) th=th=th=th 
132   (8) 
133 Y1:  phhhhh! (1) 
134 Am:   ?@(.)@ t’was funny yes. 
135 Bm:       ?@(.)@ 
 
Formulating interpretation 
The first step of interpretation on the level of the immanent meaning can be 
subdivided into the “topical structuring” (thematische Gliederung) and the 
“detailed formulating interpretation”. Structuring of the subject matters 
means differentiation of paramount topics (PT), subordinated topics (ST), 
subsubordinated topics (SST) and may be subsubsubordinated topics (SSST). 
The following example shows the topical structuring of the whole excerpt, 
because this step does not take up too much room. The „detailed formulating 
interpretation” is only presented exemplarily for the first subordinated topic. 
2.2.1 Topical Structuring  
PT 02-131: Marriage in ones „own way“ and „matchmaking“ (making 
marriage arrangements)  
ST  02-28: Difficulties in founding a family 
 SST 02-11: Founding a family is nice but not easy and the time for 
  it “must have come”  
SST 12-27: One must find “the right one” 
  
ST  30-131: Marriage in one’s “own way” versus “matchmaking”  
SST  30-51: Marriage in his “own way” versus “adjustment to the cul-
                ture” (41-42) 
SST  52-112: Marriage by matchmaking through the family, the relatives 
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    and acquaintances in Turkey 
 SSST  56-62: Matchmaking in the region of origin of the family 
 SSST  64-112: Attempt of matchmaking by the uncle 
SST  112-131: Matchmaking is like a “Turkish film” (130) 
  
2.2.2 Detailed Formulating Interpretation  
ST  02-28: Difficulties in founding a family  
 
Founding a family is approved of, because it is something “nice”. Although 
the young men would have had several opportunities to marry, it is not 
“easy”. The opportunities of founding a family depend on the young men’s 
further development, which is not easily predictable. In this context the prob-
lem of unemployment is important. However, it is also difficult to define the 
sense or meaning of what determines a family. It is difficult to find “the 
right” person. In this context Am’s expectations are higher than other 
people’s. 
2.3. Reflecting Interpretation  
? 01 Question by Y1  
This question is an “exmanent” question, i.e., a question unconnected to any 
topic discussed so far. The preceding passage was about Turkish young 
women and the problem of virginity, but this topic had also been initiated 
through an exmanent question (a question by the interviewers) and was hard-
ly discussed by the young men. According to our rules or principles of lead-
ing a discussion the question also should include attempts to initiate narra-
tions or descriptions (see also: „Reflexive Prinzipien der Initiierung und 
Leitung von Gruppendiskussionen“ – „Reflective principles of initiating and 
leading group discussions“ in Bohnsack 2008: chapter 11.1). 
 
ST  02-28: Difficulties in founding a family 
SST 02-11: Founding a family is nice, but not easy and the time for that 
              “must have come“  
  
? 02-11 Proposition by Bm and elaboration of his proposition in interaction  
with Am  
2-05:  This utterance implies a development model, a model of collective 
(“our time”; 02) development. Therefore, Bm has some expectations about 
his further development. These expectations are still very vague and cannot 
(only) be influenced by his own plans, but they are inevitable, dependent on 
fate. Therefore, he cannot be more precise. Am explains that their uncertainty 
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has nothing to do with a lack of corresponding wishes or sketches but with 
problems in realizing these plans (“problems in enacting”). It is beyond their 
own power; it is not easy to realize their own (existing) wishes and biograph-
ical sketches.  
 
07-08: Elaboration of the difficulty of realizing (“enacting”) by Bm: “I am 
unemployed anyway” means: I am unemployed and therefore it is not easy 
(for me) anyway. Bm gives one of the reasons which prevents the realization/ 
“enacting“. However, this reason touches the prevailing conditions, pre-
conditions for the foundation of a family, and not family or the social rela-
tionships itself.  
 
09: The difficulties are increased or escalated by Am: It is not only because 
of the prevailing conditions that they are uncertain when the time for a mar-
riage has come. Another reason for their uncertainty is that for the young 
men it is not clear what exactly is the meaning of “family”.  
 
10-11: Bm would “have had some opportunities”. According to what has 
been explained before, this means that the young women would have been 
willing to marry. It has nothing to do with Am’s attractiveness that he has not 
yet got married or started a family, the reasons are obviously those already 
mentioned. – Altogether it is documented by Bm’s comments that he has 
thought about his biographical options in a responsible manner.  
 
SST 12-27: One must find “the right one” 
 
? 12-28: Elaboration of the proposition by Am  
12-16: Am now elaborates the proposition’s component mentioned in 04-05 
and 09: It is not so easy to have a family or to live together with a woman 
because the “right” woman has to be found (this especially means a woman 
who agrees with him on what “family” means, what a family is supposed to 
be). Hereby Am elaborates the background of his proposition in 09.  
Equating “having a family”, “getting married” and “living together”, or 
rather the indifference towards these alternatives, implies, that there is no 
link with tradition. Therefore a certain frankness towards the kind of rela-
tionship or rather the kind of family is implied. (Hence Am goes beyond the 
frame set by Y1’s question.)  
 
20-27: Increasing (of the) difficulty of one’s own situation (in contrast to 
12): at present they cannot find the “right one”.– Like Bm in 10-11 Am now 
emphasizes that this is not caused by a lack of attractiveness.  
- Demanding to be there for each other mutually (25-26) and also looking for a 
perfect relationship does not imply (with the background of frankness towards 
the kind of relationship) an orientation towards traditional role models, but 
the orientation towards an open relationship which can be negotiated.  
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- What is made explicit in 02-03, 05 and 15-16 also finds its expression on a 
performative level in the long breaks (15, 16, 23, 29) (which are not inter-
rupted and thus supported by Bm): they do not know exactly, they cannot 
say exactly, they are at a loss and it is not that easy.  
-  At the same time it is documented in 28 (and also in the questions asking 
for confirmation, the “question tags”: 05, 09, 16, 22-23, 26), that Am antic-
ipates that his attitude is difficult to understand. As Y1 reacts to the ques-
tions (except for 09), it seems to be addressed to him (it becomes obvious, 
that the discourse between the researchers and the persons under research is 
still relatively dominant in this stage of discussing of this topic; this will 
change later on). Am anticipates or guesses a strangeness not only towards 
the German interviewers, which becomes obvious in line 28, but also to-
wards his peers. This refers to differentiation typical for the social envi-
ronment (which can be verified by comparative analysis with other 
groups).  
 
ST 30-131: Marriage in one’s “own way” versus “matchmaking”  
         SST  30-51: Marriage in his “own way” versus “adjustment to the 
           culture” (41-42) 
 
? 30-51: Thesis-antithesis (“antithetical”) discourse between Am and Bm: 
proposition by Am, antithesis by Bm  
30 and 33:  Proposition by Am; 35-36: elaboration of the proposition by Am 
in the modus of a theory of orientation; 39-40: elaboration of the proposition 
by Am in the modus of an abstract description.  
Am gets married “in his way and his mother cannot influence him”: His 
mother cannot say anything to him or rather what his mother says cannot say 
anything to him.  
 
31-32 and 34: Antithesis by Bm in the modus of a question; 37-38 and 41-
42: elaboration of the antithesis by Bm in the modus of a theory of orienta-
tion.  
 
43: Antithesis to the antithesis (of Bm) by Am in the modus of a question  
 
44-51: Continuation of the antithesis by Bm in the modus of a “theory of 
orientation” or rather a theory about the own self. “In my way” (30) as well 
as “I live how I think it to be right” (35-36) are addressed antithetically to 
“adjusting to the own culture” by Bm. Only “adjusting to the own culture”, 
which means the culture of origin, makes it possible to answer the question 
“what you are and who you are” (49 and 51 as well as 46), which means 
answering the question concerning their own identity. In sociological voca-
bulary (in the words of Erving Goffman) Bm shows the tendency to answer 
the question “who he is” in the modus of his social identity, an identity 
which is ascribed to him, whereas Am rather adapts to his personal (individ-
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ual) identity. This means that two ways or modes of developing an identity or 
two ways of “sociality” (Sozialität) are antithetically compared. 
 
SST  52-112: Marriage by matchmaking through the family, the relatives 
   and acquaintances in Turkey 
 
? 52-62: Follow-up proposition in the modus of exemplifications by Am and 
wording/formulation of the proposition by Bm (61-62)  
Am illustrates on the basis of two examples what it leads to, according to his 
opinion, if someone “adjusts” to the culture, or rather he explains to Am the 
kind of adjustment he objects to. He disapproves of the kind of adjustment 
which leads to a marriage based on “matchmaking”. 
 
SSST  56-62: Matchmaking in the region of origin of the family 
 
Exemplification I:  
The mother refers to two different engagements in the family or ethnic 
community (“at ours” relates to a “we”-community not being questioned) 
and thereupon drafts a negative image, a so called negative “counter-
horizon”. These engagements did obviously not develop out of matchmak-
ing, which is the way she prefers. Later on, it becomes evident that she pre-
fers that modus of matchmaking in which the wife comes from the husband’s 
home region. (As the others do not keep to the traditional modus, the com-
ment implies that the modus becomes precarious.)  
 
Exemplification II:  
An acquaintance (who obviously comes from Am’s Turkish region of 
origin) tried to make Am get to know (or even marry) his only daughter (but 
without directly making his intentions clear).  
In both exemplifications a framework of orientation is implied from 
which Am distances himself. This orientation says that it is regarded as an 
adequate basis for matchmaking or rather marriage, that the female partner’s 
origin is in the home region of the husband’s family.  
This origin seems to be a guarantee for habitual concordance (a concor-
dance concerning the habitus), which is a necessary condition for the mar-
riage. (Another reason for matchmaking might be that an effective social 
control of the marital relationship can be guaranteed if the people involved 
know each other. In this sense, relatives, acquaintances or friends from the 
region are not only predestined for a marriage as husband or wife, but also as 
‘people intervening’, people who help to find a partner for someone else 
from their home region.)  
In sociological vocabulary: Am distances himself from a modus of con-
structing habitual concordance on the basis of social identity.  
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61-62 In his formulation (explication) of the proposition by Am, Bm ex-
presses that he exactly understands Am, that he approves (‘validates’) Am’s 
presentation by not opposing to it and therefore, takes the first step towards a 
synthesis.  
 
SSST 64-112: Attempt of matchmaking by the uncle 
 
? 64-112: Further exemplification in a narrative modus by Am, approval 
(validation) and thereby synthesis by Bm (97)  
Am presents in his narration further components of the “framework of orien-
tation” concerning the matchmaking:  
- The aim of matchmaking or the true intentions are not directly but merely 
indirectly discussed between the intervening person and the person a part-
ner shall be found for: “you can meet her” (75).  
- Am refuses the attempt of matchmaking also indirectly, but thus creates or 
produces ambiguity.  
- Caused by ambiguity, i.e., by the uncertain (definition of the) situation, the 
uncle insists on his attempt to matchmaking (93-94). Here it is documented 
that the way in which Am expresses his objection indirectly cannot be un-
derstood. This and also the distance towards the interventions shows the 
great distance between Am and his parent’s culture of origin.  
 
In 97 Bm helps to find the right phrases. He formulates a component of Am’s 
proposition (helps with formulating a component of Am’s framework of 
orientation). From his own experience, Bm knows the situation in which one 
suddenly realizes that one is in the middle of a situation where someone else 
(against Bm’s intentions) attempts to do matchmaking. Consequently, there 
is the danger to develop “paranoia”. By this, Bm also expresses his objection 
towards matchmaking or rather towards certain forms of matchmaking.  
Bm therefore opens up a synthesis: The bond or the adjustment to the 
culture of origin, which he had first demanded from Am, need not go so far. 
 
77-88: Inserted meta-communicative dispute (dispute on a metacommunica-
tive level): The others (or at least Bm) do not think Am’s indifference to-
wards the young woman to be credible. (The utterance of Y2 and Bm, i.e., 
their laughing, get their significance for the interpreter concerning the verba-
tim sense only through Am’s reaction in line 79). 
 
98-107 Am finds himself in a dilemma. (This is expressed in a “performato-
ry” way in the breaking off in 105 and 107 and in the disorder of the sen-
tence in 107. The experience of being entangled/caught up is so lasting that it 
is still obvious in the present situation). He did not succeed in objecting to the 
attempt at matchmaking. Am is obviously not able to express this in a manner 
according to his culture of origin. Now he can only get out of this situation by 
disapproving of his potential bride. This may risk insulting his uncle.  
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107-112: Formulation of his own proposition by Am  
 
SST 112-131: Matchmaking is like a “Turkish film” (130) 
 
? 112-126: Further exemplification in the modus of continuating the narration 
by Am in interaction with Bm:  
As Am cannot express his objection towards the whole procedure of mat-
chmaking in an adequate way, the people from the village and/or his mother 
go on matchmaking. In the end, Am is not only pursued or hunted by the 
people intervening but also by his potential wives (“paranoia” 97). Although 
the situation has the character of a pursuit, it is attractive in a way: the situa-
tion is as antiquated (“according to old tradition”, 124) but at the same time 
also as romantic as scooping water in the morning. The fact that the young 
women are interested in Am confirms as well the attractiveness of his family 
as his own (see: 10-11 and 21-22: the problem is not a lack of attractiveness) 
  
? 126-131 Conclusion by Bm in interaction with Am  
Matchmaking, i.e., making arrangements to find a partner for a young person 
and the modus of social relationships connected with it is a traditional pattern 
of orientation. This pattern was of great significance to the parental genera-
tion, but for the young people themselves it is hardly realistic, but at the same 
time as attractive, as a romantic film. 
 The kind of male existence in which the foundation of marriage and 
family is carried out on the basis of common grounds of the regional origin, 
appears to be like a film or a cliché, and as antiquated, but at the same time it 
is highly attractive because of its romantic character.  
Especially in this conclusion, the collective character of the orientations 
and experience of the two persons involved becomes obvious. Bm and Am 
both share extensively common experience or – more precisely – experience 
identical in structure, i.e., they share a conjunctive space of experience. This 
enables them to arrange the narration and its performance in a highly cooper-
ative manner (although Bm has not experienced that concrete situation told 
by Am).  
Their common experience and their common frame of orientation is 
worked out by Am and Bm in a special mode of the organization of dis-
course: the antithetical mode of discourse.  
Analysis of talk, which is able to reconstruct the process of discourse in 
its specific dramaturgy and its mode of discourse organization – in our ex-
ample it is the antithetical mode of discourse – may succeed in working out 
complex patterns of orientation in their ambivalence which is typical for our 
everyday life. By reconstructing the process of discourse, it can be shown 
that the ambivalence which documents itself in the antithetical counterposi-
tions is collectively shared, is common to both of the speakers (so we have a 
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“congruency of the frames of orientations”, as we call it; see Bohnsack 2008: 
chapter 8.1). Although at face value, it seems they express quite different 
(“incongruent”) frames of orientations.  
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